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Scott Fausti1
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ABSTRACT

This paper proposes a model of joint product smuggling which
explicitly examines the roles of uncertainty, enforcement, taxes,
and the magnitude of a real resource cost in determining the
firm's decision to smuggle and smuggling's impact on welfare and
tax revenue collection.

A framework is presented in which: 1)

the tax rate, 2) the level of government enforcement, and 3) the
real resource cost are analyzed to determine their impact on a
firm's decision to smuggle or engage in strictly legal trade.
The results derived in the paper indicate that the implied policy
solution for the smuggling problem arrived at in the earlier
literature of "the less smuggling the better" is at best
misleading.
All correspondence should be directed to Scott
Fausti, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, South
Dakota state University, Scobey Hall, Box 504A, Brookings,
south Dakota 57007-0895.
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I. Introduction.
The smuggling of imports and exports is a common phenomenon
for lesser developed countries when high tariff or export tax
rates are levied on traded goods.

Smuggling therefore raises

several serious economic issues concerning social welfare and
trade tax polices for lesser developed countries.

A literature

review of these issues by Bhagwati (1981) reveals that the
economic consequences for the interact�on of government
enforcement with smuggling have not been rigorously analyzed with
respect to trade tax revenues and welfare.
In this essay the above issues are addressed. The starting
point of the paper is the modification of Pitt's (1981) model of
joint product export smuggling. The modification allows the
incorporation of active government enforcement of the smuggling
laws.

Active enforcement is the assumption used to introduce

uncertainty into the model. 1

The results of the model indicate

that: 1) joint product smuggling does not have a strictly
negative impact on welfare as compared to the non-smuggling case,
2) increased enforcement against smuggling does not have a
strictly positive effect on welfare, 3) smuggling•s impact on tax
revenue collection is ambiguous, and 4) the presence of joint
product smuggling reduces the revenue maximizing tariff rate.

It is assumed that enforcement effort against smuggling
incurs a zero real resource cost. This is a reasonable assumption
if one assumes that increased enforcement effort against smuggling
only requires a reallocation of resources within the legal system.
1
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II. Assumptions.
The paper begins with the basic assumptions of Pitt's model
of smuggling.

of trade fixed.

Pitt assumes the small country case with the terms
The country produces two traded goods, an

exportable (X) and an importable (M), employing primary factors

purchased in competitive markets.

Production and trade are

carried out by identical firms. Domestic production is subject to
diminishing returns.

Legal and illegal trade in exports is

carried out by the same firm.

The law of one price holds in the

domestic economy.

The following additional assumptions are made so that a

model of smuggling incorporating uncertainty can be developed: 1)
firms that smuggle do incur a significant real smuggling cost; 2
2) smugglers (firms) are natives and therefore their utility
functions are embodied in the country's social welfare function;
3) export taxes are assumed to be non-prohibitive; 4) firms must
bear the risk of illegal activity and they cannot insure against

criminal penalties; 5) exporting firms have a choice between
strictly legal trade or smuggling, with the choice based on

profit maximization; 6) firms are risk neutral; and 7) if the
domestic exporting firm decides to smuggle, it will then produce
a joint product, and legal trade will act as a cloak for the
firm's illegal activity.

The firm can use four methods to

smuggle exports: a) under-invoicing of exports, b) falsely

Cooper (1974), and Deardorff and Stolper (1990) argue that
smuggling may not impose any significant real cost on society over
legal trade.
2
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declared exports, c) under-assessment of exports, and d)
clandestine smuggling of unreported production. 3
III. A Joint Product Model of Smuggling.
In addition to the assumptions made in the previous section,
it is assumed each firm can trade illegally according to a
modified Pitt smuggling function,
s* = GCL, S) .

Cl)

The variable cs*) is the quantity of good CX) made ready to
be smuggled. The variable cs*) in this model is defined as
exports made ready for smuggling across the domestic border or,
in other words, smuggling attempted. The variable CL) is the
quantity of good CX) legally traded and CS) is the quantity of
good CX) input into smuggling activity.

The function CG) is

strictly concave and a twice differentiable linear homogeneous
function.

The function CG) is assumed to have the following

properties:
Gi �

o,

Gu :S

o,

C 2)

1 � G. � 0, G.. :S O,

CJ)

GCO, S) =O,

C4)

GCL, O) =O,

CS)

s-s• � o, acs-s·>
aL

< 0,

acs-s·>
as

> 0·

(6)

Deardorff and Stolper C1990) discuss the widespread use of
smuggling method Cd) in a number of African countries.
3
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Assumption (2) states that the marginal product of legal
trade used in smuggling is non-negative and is declining in (L).
Assumption (3) states that a unit increase in the smuggling input
(S) results in a positive but less than unit increase in actual
amount of the export made ready to be smuggled, and the marginal
product of (S) is declining. Assumption (4) states that legal
trade is a necessary input into smuggling or the probability of
detection is one.

Assumption (5) states that firms can choose to

engage in legal trade only.

Assumption (6) prohibits the real

resource cost of smuggling from being negative. The real resource
cost of smuggling (s-s*) is the smuggler's selling cost in excess
of legal trade selling cost. 4 It is assumed that the actual
magnitude of smuggling•s real resource cost is exogenous to the
model. However, a change in one of the endogenous variables, (L)
or (S), affects the marginal resource cost of smuggling.

A one

unit increase in (L), ceteris paribus, reduces the marginal real
resource cost of smuggling.

A one-unit increase in (S), ceteris

paribus, increases the marginal real resource cost of smuggling.
In the literature, smuggling•s ambiguous welfare effect is
the direct result of how the real resource cost assumption is

The excess selling cost is the consequence of firms engaging
in cloaking activity to conceal illegal exports.
Martin and
Panagariya (1984), Thursby (1991), and Fausti (1992) also used this
type of approach to generate the real resource cost associated with
smuggling in their papers.
4
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modeled. 5 A negative welfare effect results from an excessive
real resource cost incurred by smugglers, while an insignificant
real resource cost produces a positive welfare effect. 6

As an

example, Pitt assumes that the cost of smuggling is composed of
either penalties and confiscation or a mixture of a real resource

cost and penal�ies and confiscation.

His welfare result is

ambiguous because the composition of the cost mix is unknown.

Pitt's assumption is altered and it is assumed that the

difference between (S) and (S*) is a real resource cost incurred
from the use of cloaking tactics employed to evade detection. 7
Smuggling is assumed to incur a risk of detection (p),

(l�p�O) such that (p=l) if (L=O).

The expected value of illegal

goods intercepted as they are moved over the border is (p•Pf•S*)
or (Pf•S*) if (L=O). The variable (Pf) is the world price of
exports. The expected value of successful smuggling is [(1p)Pf•S*].

The variable (F) is a multiple of the value of

intercepted illegal goods which is imposed as a fine, (F�l).

The

expected cost of interception to the smuggler is (p•F•Pf •S*) and
For example see the papers by Bhagwati and Hansen (1973),
Pitt (1981), Martin and Panagariya (1984), Sheikh (1989), Schollr
(1989), Thursby (1991), and Faust! (1992).
5

The result of the welfare effect being dependent on the
magnitude of the real resource cost is what Pitt and Bhagwati and
Hansen refer to as the ambiguous welfare result attributed to
smuggling.
6

The real resource cost, for example, may take the form of:
1) special packing cost necessary to hide smuggled goods, and 2)
the transport cost of shipping unreported production out of the
country via clandestine ports.
7
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is at least (Pt•s*) if (L=O). Expected smuggling revenue net of
interception cost is equal to [(1-p•F)•Pt•s*] and is non-positive
if (L=O).

The expected value of output price per unit of smuggled good

at the border for the smuggling firm is E [P•]

=

(1-p•F)•Pt and is

non-positive if (L=O). The expected value of revenue per input

unit of the smuggled good at the border for the smuggling firm is
E [P•]·(S*/S) = (1-p•F)•Pt•(S*/S) and is non-positive if (L=O). The

expected value for the output price per unit of legally exported
goods is E [P1] = pt•(l-t) = pL and represents the legal tax
distorted price for exports.
valorem export tax.

these risk factors.

The variable (t) denotes the ad

It is assumed the firm knows the values of

It is assumed each firm has a decision to make. The firm
can engage in joint product smuggling or it can sell its output

at the legal domestic export tax distorted price (P1), as implied
by the assumption G(L,0)=0. 8

If the firm decides to smuggle, it

receives the weighted average price for its total output.
If the firm decides to become involved in joint product

illegal trade, then its situation can be thought of as a lottery.
The expected value of the lottery is dependent on variables
(p, y•, F).

The probability of apprehension (p) is determined by

the government.

It is assumed the firm's probability of being

caught is (p) if it engages in cloaking activities.

If it does

strictly legal trade profits are derived from equation (7)
when it is assumed S=O.
8
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not cloak its illegal activity, then the probability of
apprehension is equal to one.

The variable (F) determines the

monetary equivalent of the punishment imposed on the firm by the
government if the firm is caught in the illegal act of smuggling.
Fines are considered a transfer to the government.

As in Pitt's

paper, profit maximization in production implies producing on the
production possibility curve where the marginal rate of
transformation equals domestic relative prices (P*) .

The

variable (Y8 ) represents profits from joint product export trade.
Smugglers are assumed to be profit maximizers.

Expected

profit for the smuggling firm is given by equation (7) ,

E (Y8 ) =Pf•G (L, S) - (p) •F•Pf•G (L, S) + pf. (1-t) •L - p*. (L+S) • 9 (7)
The term [Pf•G (L, S) - (p) •F•Pf•G (L, S) ] denotes expected

smuggling revenues; pf• (l-t) •L represents revenues for legal
trade.

As in Pitt's article, firms earn zero economic profit in

the long run.

Setting equation (7) to zero and solving for p*

generates an expression for the long-run equilibrium domestic
price ratio as a weighted average of prices received for goods
legally exported in conjunction with goods illegally exported:
p•

=

pf·(l-t) ·(L)
(1-p·F) .p f·(S*)
( 8)
+
(L+S)
(L+S)
.

The exporting firm's decision of whether to engage in
strictly legal trade (S=O) or engage in smuggling and produce a
joint product (L+S*) will determine the long-run equilibrium
The first and second order conditions can be found in
appendix (A) .
9

8

domestic price ratio (DPR). If firms smuggle, then Pitt's "price
disparity" result is generated: p* > pL.
IV. The Firm's Decision Mechanism

In the economic literature on uncertainty, it has been

established that a risk neutral firm confronted with uncertainty

will make its profit maximization decision as if it were

operating in a certainty environment. 10

Joint product illegal

trade profit represents an uncertain prospect and legal trade
represents a certain prospect.

The firm's decision to engage in

joint product smuggling (L+S*) or engage in strictly legal trade
(L) is based on a comparison of expected profits from joint
product smuggling to profits earned from strictly legal trade.
The firm's decision will determine the domestic price ratio.
If the firm to engages in joint product smuggling or strictly
legal trade, it does so based on the following decision criteria
condition statement:

where (p•F) is the expected value of punishment. 11

Condition

(9) leads to the first proposition of the paper:

1°
For a discussion of the behavior of a competitive firm
operating under uncertainty see Hey (1979).

Condition (9) is derived from equation (8). Condition (9)
makes a comparison of revenue coming from illegal trade (Pt•s*•(l
p•F)) to the revenue which would be earned by channeling illegal
goods through legal channels, (Pf•S•(l-t)).
11

9

PROPOSITION 1. IL the Lirm receives a higher price via joint
product smuggling, then all Lirms will smuggle and Pitt's price
disparity phenomena will result.
To establish proposition 1, the implications of condition

(9) are examined.

Condition (9) states that if the eXPected

value of revenue per input unit of smuggled good is greater than
the per unit revenue that could be earned by selling (S) through
legal channels, then all firms smuggle and DPR=P*. If not, then
DPR=pL. The following statements outline the firm•s decision
mechanism for engaging in joint product smuggling or the strictly
legal trade alternative:

(10)

if (S*+s) •(1-p•F) < (1-t), then S=O, DPR is pL,

(11)

if (s*+S)•(l-p•F) > (1-t), then S>O, DPR is p*,

(12)

if (S*+S)•(1-p•F) = (1-t),
then indeterminate, DPR is pL:p*.

(13)

Under the assumption of risk neutrality and a real cost
associated with smuggling (s-s*), the domestic price ratio is
determined by the higher of the legal and illegal trade prices.
Equations (11) and (12) state that the firm•s decision to smuggle
or engage in strictly legal trade is dependent on that
comparison.

Equation (13) states that the coexistence of legal

trade only firms eXPorting (L) with firms that smuggle (joint

product eXPorts) can only occur when the combined value of

eXPected punishment and the real resource cost equals the eXPort
tax.

Thus, condition (12) above establishes proposition 1.

model, unlike other models found in the previous literature,

This

10

requires the smuggling fira to account for the real resource cost
it incurs in its output price structure and thus aake it a
contributing factor in the fira•s decision to smuggle.

v.

The Effect of Enforcement, Taxes, and the Taras of Trade on

Smuggling Activity.

In this section a comparative static analysis is conducted.

The analysis examines the effect of changes in enforcement

activity, taxes, and the teras of trade on smuggling activity and

the domestic price ratio. The comparative static results are then

used in the analysis of how changes in these exogenous variables

affect total exports, tax revenue collection, and social welfare.
Beginning with the affect of a change in enforcement:
PROPOSITION 2. In the presence of smuggling, increasing the
monetary penalty or the probability of detection will: 1) reduce
legal and illegal exports; 2) have a strictly negative effect on
the DPR; and 3) have an ambiguous effect on the real resource
cost of smuggling.
To establish proposition 2, the comparative static results
derived in appendices (B&C) are examined:

aLJap <O, asJap <O,

aLJaF <O, as/aF <O, aP*Jap <O, aP*/aF <O. What is interesting
about the comparative static results is that they are counter

intuitive.

One would noraally expect increased enforcement to

reduce illegal exports and increase legal exports.

However, this

result is attributed to the nature of joint product smuggling in

11
conjunction with declining average export prices as enforcement
activity increases. 12
With respect to the real resource cost of smuggling, an
increase in either enforcement instrument (p or F) has an

ambiguous effect on cs-s*), via the negative effect enforcement

has on (L) and (S), as equation (6) indicates.

This result is in

contrast to the positive effect (increased cost) derived in the

paper by Martin and Panagariya.

The ambiguous effect derived

here results from increased enforcement reducing smuggling, which
reduces the total real resource cost. But at the same time,

increased enforcement reduces legal trade, which reduces the
protection from detection and requires smugglers to increase
cloaking activities.

It is the cloaking activities that generate

the real resource cost in this paper.

The above discussion

establishes proposition 2.

The next issue is the affect of an increase in the export

tax:
PROPOSITION 3. In the presence of smuggling, increasing the
export tax will: 1) reduce legal and illegal exports; 2) have a
strictly negative effect on the DPR; and 3) have an ambiguous
effect on the real resource cost of smuggling.

The results derived for the effect of changes in
enforcement activity on smuggling and the domestic price ratio are
consistent with the literature.
Martin and Panagariya (1984),
Sheikh (1989), Thursby (1991), and Fausti (1992) all show that
increased enforcement has a negative effect on smuggling volume and
the domestic price ratio. However, the effect of increased
enforcement on legal trade volume has been addressed in the papers
by Martin and Panagariya, and Thursby.
The former derived an
ambiguous result and the latter a positive result.
12
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To establish proposition 3, the comparative static results
derived in appendices (B&C) are examined: aL/at <0,

as/at

<O,

aP*/at <O. These results are counter intuitive with respect to
smuggling activity.

One would expect smuggling effort to

increase as the export tax rises, however, since legal trade is a
necessary input into smuggling, as legal exports decline, export
smuggling declines. 13

The tax increase has an ambiguous effect

on smuggling•s real resource cost and this result can be
explained in a manner similar to the enforcement discussion.

The

above discussion establishes proposition 3.
The next issue is the affect of an increase in the world
price of exports:
PROPOSITION 4. In the presence oL smuggling, an increase in p!
will: 1) increase legal and illegal exports; 2) have a strictly
positive eLLect on the DPR; and 3) have an ambiguous eLLect on
the real resource cost oL smuggling.
To establish proposition 4, the comparative static results
derived in appendices (B&C) are examined: aL/apf >O, as/apf >O,
aP*/aPf >O. In the presence of smuggling, the comparative static
results demonstrate that if the terms of trade (Pf) improve,
which implies the world price of exports increase, the amount of

The results derived above for the effect of an increase
in the tax rate on smuggling, legal trade, and the domestic price
ratio are in contrast to the results found in the earlier
literature. Sheikh (1989) , and Fausti (1992) demonstrate that an
increase in the tax rate does increase the volume of smuggling and
has a negative effect on the domestic price ratio. However, these
authors do not address the issue of the effect on legal trade
volume. The results found in the paper by Martin and Panagariya
show an ambiguous effect on smuggling volume and a negative effect
on legal trade volume.
13

13

(X) produced for illegal trade (S) and the amount for legal trade
(L) for the smuggling firm increase.

The (DPR) will rise and

total exports will increase, which will increase total tax
revenues.

The effect on (s-s*), however, is ambiguous. This

contrasts with the results found in the paper by Martin and
Panagariya.

In their paper, the real resource cost is

independent of the terms of trade; and thus, an increase in the

terms of trade has no·effect on the real resource cost.
above discussion establishes proposition 4.

The

VI. The Effect of Joint Product Smuggling on Total Exports and
Trade Tax Revenues.

Expanding on the work by Johnson (1974), Pitt (1981),

Deardorff and Stolper (1990), and Fausti (1992), this section

will examine the effect of joint product smuggling on export
production and tax revenue collection.

In this section an

additional assumption is made: that the exported good (X) is a
pure export. 14
The first issue addressed in this section is the impact of

the introduction of joint-product smuggling on total exports,

legal exports and tax revenue collection:

PROPOSITION s. The introduction of joint-product smuggling will:
1) increase total export production; and 2) have an ambiguous
effect on legal exports. Thus, the introduction of joint product
smuggling has an ambiguous effect on tax revenue collection.
14
A pure export good implies that there is no domestic
consumption of that good.

14
To establish proposition 5, the analysis begins with the question
of how the introduction of joint product smuggling affects total
export production, denoted (X) .

The small country assumption

made earlier implies that the demand for exports is perfectly
elastic. The level of export production is therefore determined
by supply.

Assuming that the level of total export production,

after the export tax is levied but before smuggling is
introduced, is equal to L1 ,
X1

=

(14)

L1•

After smuggling is introduced, the level of total export
production is equal to the sum of legal and illegal exports,
X2

=

Lz

+ S2•

(15)

Assuming the supply of total exports has a positive relationship
with the price of exports, one would expect that whenever (P* �
pL) , then (X2 � Xi) .
equivalently, S2

�

Given that (S2 � O) , then
X1

-

L2•

Lz

+ S2 � X11 or

Using (14) , this implies condition

(16) ,
(16)
Equation (16) demonstrates that the production of exports
destined to be marketed via illegal channels is greater than the
change in the production of exports destined to be marketed via
legal channels.

However, as in Pitt's paper, it can not be

determined if the amount of X marketed via legal trade channels
increases or decreases. Therefore, the affect of smuggling on

15

export tax revenues is ambiguous. 15 The above discussion
establishes proposition 5.

Changing the assumptions again, assume that the export tax

is set to maximize revenues collected before joint product
smuggling begins. since it is assumed that country produces a
pure export good, domestic consumption can be ignored. Domestic

production and thus export supply is assumed to be solely

dependent on the exogenous world price for the exported good.
Any ad valorem tax levied on exports must be fully absorbed by
domestic producers. Given this set of circumstances, it is
assumed that legal export supply is actually a function of the
export tax L(t), ceteris paribus. 16

The government's total

revenue function is defined as,

L'<O, L'=dL/dt.

The sign for L' is taken from appendix B.

(17)
Total tax revenue is

defined as revenue collected on exports evaluated at world
prices.

To determine the revenue maximizing tax rate, the first

Fausti (1992) used this approach to discuss the impact of
smuggling on total exports. Pitt (1981), and Deardorff and Stolper
(1990) also derive ambiguous results for the effect of the
introduction of smuggling on legal trade. They indicate that the
introduction of smuggling could actually increase tax revenue
collected. In the paper by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1973), the
introduction of strictly clandestine smuggling has a strictly
negative effect on revenue collected from a given tariff rate.
15

16
If one assumes that legal trade is a function of the
domestic price of exports, L(P), and P = pt. (1-t), the results
remain unaltered. The decision to make legal trade a function of
the tax was done to simplify the mathematics presented in the
paper.

16

derivative (dTR/dt) is derived and set to zero in equation (18)
and the revenue maximizing tax rate is given in equation (19) ,
t0

=

(18)
(19)

- (L/L') >O.

When joint product smuggling is introduced, the government's
total revenue function is altered in the following manner,
(20)

TR = t•Pf•L (t, S) + p•F•Pt•G (L, S) , S'<O, S'=dS/dt.

Notice that TR is now also a function of confisication revenues.
The legal export supply function (L) is altered so that legal
exports are a function of t and s. The illegal export supply
function is denoted G (L, S) .

aLJas

The paritial derivitive

capatures the affect of the introduction of smuggling on legal
exports. From the discussion above its sign was determined to be
The signs for L' and S' are assumed to be consistent

ambigous.

with those derived in appendix B.

Following the same procedure

as above, the revenue maximizing tax rate is derived,

dTR/dt = pf.L + pf•t• [L'+aL/as·S'] +
pf•p • F• [Gi_ • L' +
t1 = -{ (L + p•F• [Gi,•L' +
{L' +

aL,aS•S'}

a L/a S• S'
Gi,•aL/aS•S'

Gi_ •

+ Gs•S'] = 0,

( 21)

+ G8•S'] ) } /

>O.

(22)

Equation (22) brings the discussion to proposition 6:
PROPOSITION 6. The introduction of joint-product smuggling will
reduce the revenue maximizing tax rate if aL;asso, and have an
ambigous effect if aL/aS>O.

To establish proposition 6, the ratio of t 1/t0 is examined under
the following assumptions: 1)

aLJas

=O; 2)

aLJas

<0; and 3)

aL/as

17
>O. If the ratio is less than one, then revenue maximizing

tax rate is lower when there is smuggling activity. If the ratio
is greater than one, then the revenue maximizing tax rate is
higher when there is smuggling activity.

In appendix (D) it is

demonstrated that when the introduction of smuggling has no

effect on legal exports i. e. , aL/as =O, the ratio t1 /t0 <1. If it
is assumed that the introduction of smuggling reduces legal

exports (aL/as <O), then the ratio is again less than one. If it

is assumed that the introduction of smuggling increases legal

exports (aL/as >O), then the ratio is positive but its magnitude
is ambiguous. However, if the contribution of confiscation

revenues to total revenues (TR) is small, then t1 /t0 > 1.

The

implication for this case is that the revenue maximizing tax rate
increases in the presences of smuggling.

appendix (D) establish proposition 6. 17

The results derived in

The policy implication

for lesser developed countries which employ trade taxes as a

revenue raising device is that they may over or under estimate

the tax rate necessary for revenue maximization if smuggling and
enforcement levels are not accounted for in their calculations.
VII. Smuggling, Enforcement and Taxes: The Welfare Implications.
The real resource cost of smuggling in this model is equal

to pt. (s-s*) and represents the total welfare loss associated

17
This set of results extends the discussion by Johnson
(1974) and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1973) on how the introduction
of smuggling effects the revenue maximizing tax rate.

18
with smuggling.

The negative welfare effect can be divided into

two parts: 1) a negative effect on prices and production; and 2)
a loss in government revenue.

The negative price effect is

internalized by the smuggling firm and is reflected in the firm's
output price.

The welfare loss due to a real resource cost not

accounted for in the smuggling firm's output price is the value
of lost government confiscation revenues that would have accrued
if cs-s*=o) . The welfare loss not accounted for by the firm can
be considered a dead weight loss to society (OWL) and it is equal
to: OWL= (p·F) ·Pt· (s-s*) .

The overall welfare effect of

smuggling depends on whether the positive welfare effect of an
improvement in domestic relative prices due to the introduction
of smuggling outweighs the negative welfare effect of the dead
weight loss.
A comparison of the welfare level attained when "all firms
smuggle" to the welfare level attained when "all firms engage in
strictly legal trade" can be determined by answering two
question: 1)

what effect does smuggling have on the domestic

price ratio? and 2) is the change in the total value of exported
goods smuggled greater than the total value of those exports if
they were shipped through legal channels instead?.

The first

question is answered by equations (11) through (13) : smuggling
will only occur if (P*�pL) .

The second question can be answered

by first assuming (P*>pL) ; then, by rearranging equation (10) the
following condition (23) results,

pt.s*• (l-p•F) - Pt•S• (l-t) > O.

(23)
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Condition (23) states that if (P*>pl,), then the smuggling firm
receives a higher total value for its exports by engaging in
illegal trade.

The firm, however, does not consider the (OWL) to

society generated by the real resource cost associated with

smuggling.

In order for smuggling to increase the total social

value of exports (welfare) in comparison to the strictly legal
trade alternative, condition (24) must be met,

pt. s*·(1-p•F) - pt. g. (1-t) - (p·F). pt . (s-s*) > o.

(24)

Condition (24) reduces to condition (25), which can be considered
the income effect attributed to smuggling when smuggling incurs a
real resource cost,
(S*+S)-(p•F) > (1-t).

(25)

In comparing condition (25) to equation (12), it is clear that
(25) is the stronger condition.

This implies it is possible for

smuggling to cause a decline in the total social value of

exports. The above analysis demonstrates that smuggling can
reduce the social value of exports if condition (25) is not met.
An analysis of the social welfare effect of smuggling, however,
must also consider the effect smuggling has on the domestic price
ratio. For this purpose an indirect utility function (V) is

introduced and it is assumed it can be used as a proxy for the
social welfare function.

Assume welfare is a function of the

domestic price ratio (DPR) and income (Y). 18 Assume income is

positively related to the total social value of exports. The

Under the assumption of risk neutrality, income is an
appropriate proxy for welfare.
18
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total social value of exports includes both private and public
sector revenues generated by the export trade.

Assume all other

income sources are held constant and enforcement effort does not
incur a real resource cost.

Under these assumptions the indirect

utility function is defined as V (DPR, Y) , and has the following
properties i av/aDPR>O I av/aY>O • 19

The discussion above leads to the next proposition in the

paper:
PROPOSITION 7. The welfare effect of introducing joint-product
smuggling can not be strictly negative or all smuggling will end.
To establish proposition 7, the condition given in equation
(12) must first be satisfied.

This implies that firms will

smuggle. The welfare effect of smuggling will be positive if
condition (25) is met.

This is due to the fact that the change

in domestic price ratio and the change in the total social value
of exports are both positive.

The welfare effect of smuggling,

however, is ambiguous if condition (25) is not met. This
ambiguous result is the consequence of the (DPR) increasing,
while (Y) declines. The ambiguous result derived above provides a
stronger argument in the favor of smuggling than the ambiguous
welfare results obtained by Bhagwati and Hansen and Pitt. Their
ambiguous welfare results are the consequence of smuggling either
The indirect utility function (V) has the following
properties: 1) (V) is continuous at all DPR>O, and Y>O; 2) (V) is
non-decreasing in (DPR) and (Y) ; and 3) (V) is homogenous of degree
zero in (DPR) and (Y) . It should be noted that an increase in the
(DPR) implies an improvement in domestic relative prices. For a
discussion of the properties of indirect utility functions see
Varian (1984) .
19
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having a strictly positive or strictly negative effect on welfare
depending on the magnitude of the real resource cost.

Given that

the magnitude of the real resource cost is unknown in their
papers they conclude that the welfare effect is ambiguous. In
this paper smuggling does not have a strictly negative effect on
welfare.

The welfare effect is strictly positive or ambiguous

when the real resource cost is excessive.

In the joint product

model, smuggling activity will become indeterminate or end before
the welfare effect of smuggling becomes strictly negative.
proposition 7 is established.

Furthermore, unlike their

Thus

analysis, this paper provides the mathematical conditions
necessary for a positive or an ambiguous welfare result to
occur. 20
The next issue to be addressed is the affect of a change in
the level of enforcement on welfare:
PROPOSITION 8. The welfare effect of increased enforcement is
strictly negative when the welfare effect of smuggling is
strictly positive.
To establish proposition 8, the affect of increased
enforcement is examined below. Proposition 2 established that

increasing either (p) or (F) causes a decline in Land S and the
DPR. If smuggling is not eliminated, then the total social value

of exports under the smuggling regime declines, as indicated by
equation (25). This establishes proposition 8.

As in the paper by Deardorff and Stolper, the welfare
effect of smuggling in this model is strictly positive, if
smuggling does not incur a real resource cost.
20
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The last issue to be addressed is the affect of an increase
in the tax rate on welfare:

PROPOSITION 9. The welfare effect of an increase in the tax rate
is strictly negative.
To establish proposition 9, the affect of an increase in the
tax rate is examined below. Proposition 3 established that
increasing the export tax causes L and s and the (DPR) to
decline. Equation (25) indicates that an increase in the export
tax will not alter smuggling•s improvement of the total social
value of exports over the strictly legal trade alternative.

This

result establishes proposition 9.
The final issue is the case of smuggling coexisting with
strictly legal trade.

This can occur only when (P*=pl-) . If

smuggling coexists with strictly legal trade, then the change in
the domestic price ratio is zero and the change in the total
social value of exports is negative as condition (25) would
indicate for (P*=pl-) . For the situation depicted by equation
(13) , the welfare effect is negative.

However, in this case the

existence of strictly legal trade and/or smuggling is
indeterminate.

This result mirrors the result attained in the

paper by Bhagwati and Hansen when (P*=pl-) , and the conclusion of
this paper concurs with their conclusion of "the less smuggling
the better" for this case. For this case, any change in an
exogenous variable which causes a decline in the (DPR) will
eliminate smuggling.
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VIII.

Summary.
The purpose of this essay is to extend the analysis of

Bhagwati and Hansen and other economists who have made a
contribution to a greater understanding of the economic
consequences of illegal transactions in international trade.

The

focus of this essay is the effect of enforcement and taxes on
smuggling, welfare, and tax revenue collection.
the model are as follows: 1)

The results of

smuggling can have a strictly

positive effect on welfare; 2) the level of enforcement, taxes,
and the real resource cost affects the firm's decision to
smuggle; 3) if smuggling is welfare enhancing, an increase in
export taxes has a negative effect on joint export trade and
welfare; 4) if the welfare effect of smuggling is positive, then
increased government enforcement against smuggling has an
negative effect on welfare and total exports; and if increased
enforcement does not eliminate smuggling, then tax revenues will
fall; 5) improvement in the terms of trade will increase the
amount of legal and illegal goods the smuggling firm will export;
and 6) the presence of smuggling reduces the revenue maximizing
tax rate.
The general conclusion of the paper is that if a country
tries to eliminate smuggling, it may reduce welfare and tax
receipts. If one compares the policy implications derived in this
paper with those found in the earlier literature, it is clear
that there is a difference in the economic impact of policy
changes on the Pitt type of joint product smuggling as compared

24
to the Bhagwati and Hansen type of clandestine smuggling.
a government decides to implement a policy in reaction to

Before

smuggling activity, it should be aware of which type of smuggling

is most prevalent in its economy.
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Appendix (A)
The profit maximization first order conditions for equation
(7) are,
(la)

oY
aL

=

(1 -p ·F) .p f ·GL + p f . (1-t) - p• =

(2a)

oY
as

o,

- (1-p ·F) ·P f ·G. - p• = 0.

The term (Pt) , is the fixed international terms of trade and
(t) is the ad valorem export tax rate. First order conditions
(la) and (2a) state that the marginal cost of an additional unit
of tradeable will just equal its revenue in trade, be it legal or
illegal trade. An additional unit of legal trade will result in
additional le?al revenue pf • (l-t) and additional smuggling reve
nue ( 1-p • F) ·P ·Gi.·
The profit maximization second order conditions for equation
(7) are,
(3a)

;p.y2 = (1-p·F) ·P f ·Gu

aL

<

o,

(4a)

oY
ar...as

.p f ·Gu

>

0,

(Sa)

;p.y2
as

(1-p ·F) ·p f ·Gss

<

O,

= (1 -p•F) .p f .GSL

>

0.

(6a)

asa
;p.y
L

= (1-p ·F)

=

The partial derivative (G.) is the marginal product of (S)
in the production of (S*) and is assumed to be positive. The
partial derivative (Gi.) is the marginal product of legal trade in
production of (S*) and is assumed to be positive. The second
order partial derivatives (G..) and (Gu.) are assumed to be nega-
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tive because of the concavity assumption imposed on (G). The
cross partial derivatives, (G.L, Gt.), are assumed positive and
small. This implies that the marginal productivity of either
input increases if the other input is increased. The second
order conditions for profit maximization hold when it is assumed
that the cross partial derivatives are positive and small.
f
(7a) A -_ P

{

(1 -p · F) • GLL
(1-p ·F) • GSL

(1-p ·F) •

GLS] , DET

(1-p F) GSS
O

•

(A)

>0•

Under the assumption that second order conditions given in
equation (7a) hold, profit maximization is assured for the
smuggling firm.
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Appendix (B)
In order to analyze the effect of a change in the trade tax
or a change in enforcement variables or the world price of
exports on the smuggler's optimal level of legal exports (L) and
illegal attempted exports (S), we have to rewrite the first order
conditions in appendix (A) in the following style in order to
perform a comparative static analysis,

(2b) Z2 = (L,S; p f, p,F, t) = (1 - p•F) ·p f • G8

-

p• = 0.

Assuming the second order conditions for a profit maximiza
tion are satisfied, we have the following pair of implicit
functions: 1) L = L(Pt, p, F, t); 2) s = S(Pt, p, F, t). Taking the
total differential of (Z 1 ) and (Z2 ), with respect to the endoge
nous and exogenous variables, the following results are derived
for dL, dS, dt, dp, dF, dPf:
(3b)

(4b)

u ] < O,
dzi = [ (1-p·F) • p f G�

dL

':::.; = [ (1-p • F) • p f . G.r.sl

(Sb)

(7b)

dz1 = [ p· p f . GL]
dF

> O,

>

0,
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(8b)

dz1

dP f

(9b)

(lOb)

dz 2

= [(1 -p·F)· P f ·G88]

dS

dz2
dL

dz2
dt

dz 2

(13b)

dF

dz2

>

dPf

0,

= O,

dz 2
= [ F· P f • G8]
dp

(12b)

O,

<O,

= [ (1-p • F) • P f · G8L]

(llb)

( 14b)

<

= -[(1-p • F) • GL + (1-t)]

>

0,

-[p· Pf ·G8 ]> 0,

= - [ ( 1-p·F ) ·G81

<O.

Imposing the second order conditions on the Hessian matrix
below, the determinant of the Hessian is positive. This is a
reasonable assumption since the main diagonal matrix elements are
negative and large -- large, that is, in comparison to the off
diagonal elements of the matrix as described in appendix (A) .
This assumption is used to determine the signs in the comparative
static analysis below,

L

(15b)

s

dzi fdL

dzi fdS

dz2 /dL

dz2 /dS

=

+
+

>

o.

By applying Cramer's rule the following comparative static
results can be derived: aL/at, aL/ap, aL/aF, aL/aPt, as/aPt,

as,at, as,a p, as,aF,
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L

+

(16b)

(17b)

S

aLJat

=

+

o
+

+

<

L

(19b)

+

+

+
+

I

s

+

(18b)

<

+

- +
+ o
+

as,at =

o,

aLJap
as,ap /

o,

s
=

+

<

+

o,

I

<

+

(21b)

<

=

o,

L
(20b)

,

=

+

o,

as,aF =

I

+

+

+

+

<

o,
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L
(22b)

S

,

+

>

(23b)

+

o.

I
I
32

Appendix (C)
The equilibrium domestic price ratio , Equation ( 8 ) , is given
below in ( le) . The effect of an exogenous variable change on (P*)
is provided below. The indirect affects due to changes in the
exogenous variables on (L) and ( S) are ambiguous. Therefore , I
will assume the direct effect dominates.
( le}

· P t' • ( S * )___
· F) _______
] +
[ ( 1 -p
_._._....,.....
P • = _____

(L+S)

( 2 c}

[ p t' · ( l - t ) · (L} ]

L+S)

iJp •

( 3 c)

( 4 c)

ap

iJp •

aF

=-

oP*

at

L}
( p t' . ----'"' - _;...._
<
+
(L S)

= [ ( 1 -p
- · F) · ( S * ) ] +

(L+S)

0•

[ ( 1 - t) • ( L) ]
( L + S)

> 0.

